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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
R. H. Clark*
In his futuristic novel of a political society destitute of
individual privacy, 1984, George Orwell has his central character,
Winston, reminisce about the past. "Tragedy, he preceived, belonged to the ancient time, to a time when there were still privacy,
love, and friendship, and when the members of a family stood by
one another without needing to know the reason."' Within the context of the novel, privacy emerges as something far more crucial
than simply a sentimental value like love or friendship. In reality,
a society devoid of individual privacy makes the very basis of democracy-individualism-difficult to attain. An individual who is
constantly under surveillance, or one who knows that at any time
he may be observed, will limit his external conduct to prescribed
standards of safe conformity. Internally, if there is no outlet for
one's own individualistic tendencies, the mind comes to fit into a
conformist mold much the same as one's external actions. An absence of privacy is crucial for totalitarian government to subsist.
Within American society today, privacy has become a much
discussed topic.' A number of factors-urbanization, technology,
the welfare state, cold war security pressures-have all contributed
to a serious diminishment of the individual's privacy in comtemporary American life. Increasingly as privacy has lessened for indivduals and groups, so too has the vital interrelationship between privacy and democracy become clearer. One particularly important
response has been that of the American legal system, principally
through the actions of the United States Supreme Court.3 As mem* Attorney, Antitrust Division, Justice Department, Washington, D.C. A.B., University
of California (Riverside), 1966; M.A., University of California (Santa Barbara), 1967, Ph.D.,
1970; J.D;, Capital University, 1977. The views expressed herein represent those of the author
and not the Department of Justice.
1. G. ORWELL, 1984, 28 (1949). Two novels with similar themes are A. HuXLEY, BRAVE
NEW WORLD (1932), and I. LEVIN, Tins PERFECT DAY (1970).
2. See, e.g., V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY
INVADERS (1964); J. ROSENBERG, THE DETH OF PRIVACY (1970); and particularly A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).

3.

For a general sourcebook of effective materials on the response of the American legal
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bers of the Court surveyed past precedent to acquire tools for fashioning a constitutional protection for privacy, it became evident
that the Supreme Court had many times in the past protected an
interest in privacy, though very seldom had it been recognized as
such.' In 1965, the Court took a major step toward constitutionally
safeguarding privacy qua privacy from governmental intrusions in
the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.' The rationale employed by
Justice Douglas in writing the majority opinion emphasized the
theme that the Court historically had long recognized and protected
a right to privacy, although without so characterizing the interest
shielded.
I.

Griswold v. Connecticut: THE GENESIS OF "PENUMBRAL PRIVACY"
Viewed from the perspective of nearly a decade, it seems indisputable that one of the Warren Court's most significant and lasting
accomplishments was its explicit recognition of a constitutional
right to privacy. Certainly, past Courts had spoken on numerous
occasions about a "right of privacy."' Indeed, during the 1940's the
fourth amendment's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures had become, in short-hand terminology, "the right to privacy." 7 Occasional decisions in the first 8 and fifth amendment' areas
had also made reference to such a right. However, it was not until
the 1965 decision in Griswold that the issue of constitutional privacy
came suddenly to the forefront. Not only was the factual background of the case dramatic, with the state prosecuting a physician
for counseling his patients in the use of contraceptives,10 but the
strategy employed by the Court's majority in striking down the
Connecticut statute" was unique. Griswold marked the first occasion upon which the Supreme Court discussed a composite right to
system in protecting privacy, including both public and private law, see
PIVACY: ESSAYS AND CASES,

4.

THE RIGr TO

(P. Dionisopoulos & C. Ducat eds. 1976).

See generally Clark, ConstitutionalSources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19

VILLANOVA L. REV.

833 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clark].

5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Public Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 (1952).
7. See Clark, supra note 4 at 866-68 and accompanying notes therein.
8. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
11. The statute provided: "Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty. dollars or
imprisoned not less than sixty day nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed by P.A. 828, § 214, 1971).
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privacy, drawing its substance from a number of the Bill of Rights'
guarantees in language which appeared to.indicate a strong constitutional presumption against any manner of governmental infringement.
The Supreme Court spoke through Mr. Justice Douglas, the
member of the Court most consistently concerned about privacy in
contemporary American society. In his view, the attempted regulation of the most intimate aspect of the marriage relationship (the
statute prohibited the giving of advice, instruction, or information
pertaining to contraception) invaded a constitutional "zone of privacy," even though no such right was explicitly recognized in the
Constitution. 2 For Justice Douglas, the Constitution's silence did
not necessarily preclude the existence of such a zone. Emanating
from the explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights were penumbras
which gave the stated rights "life and substance.' 3 As one commentator has written:
[T]he Constitution protects, without specific enumeration, certain
essential freedoms of the individual. Labeled peripheral rights, these
freedoms are derived from the penumbra or total scope of the constitutional amendments. The penumbral approach incorporates rights
not explicitly included in any amendment with the rationale that
their existence is vital "in making express guarantees of the various
amendments fully meaningful." Without these peripheral rights the
enumerated rights would be vulnerable.'
Thus, the rights of free speech and press, for example, must
necessarily include the rights to distribute, read, and receive such
matter in order to fully implement the intended protection. 5
Justice Douglas' analysis of the emanations from the first eight
amendments further supported the existence of a "zone of privacy."
Case law had established that the first amendment protected political association from governmental intrusion;"6 that the third amendment safeguarded the individual from intrusions into his domestic
privacy; 7 and that the fourth and fifth amendments jointly recog12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 484.
14. Note, Right of Privacy-Access to ContraceptiveInformation, 17 WESTERN RESERvE
L. REv. 601, 602 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
15. 381 U.S. at 482-83.
16. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1959).
17. Justice Douglas' reliance upon the third amendment, although not an intergral part
of his thesis, seems to be misplaced. First, there appear to be neither cases nor commentary
giving any definitive interpretation to the third amendment. See E. DUMBAuLD, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 60 (1957). Second, the Congressional debates pertaining
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nized a zone of privacy attendant to criminal prosecutions. 8
Equally significant, the ninth amendment recognized that not all
rights protected by the Constitution are explicitly stated in its language.'" Hence, "[tihese cases bore witness that the right of privacy . . . was a legitimate one."20 Obviously, the Connecticut statconflict with the "zone of privacy," and conute was in irreparable 21
sequently was invalid.
This "composite" right to privacy, as it has emerged from
Griswold and decisions both antedating and subsequent to that decision, 22 is composed of three fundamental constitutional guarantees
and has three principal dimensions. The first amendment protection of free speech and assembly is designed to safeguard the anonymity of political belief and, especially, political association. It
protects the individual from being compelled to publicly disclose
the content of his political beliefs or his membership in political
associations. The fourth amendment, certainly the core element in
constitutional privacy, safeguards one's reasonable expectations of
privacy by imposing stiff procedural requisites which must be met
before a breach of the sanctity of one's physical location may
occur. 23 The third and most absolute component is the fifth amendment's ban on compulsory self-incrimination, a right which safeguards the innermost sanctity of a person's mind from compulsory
governmental intrusion. The total effect of these guarantees is to
create a zone of privacy around various personal interests that the
government may not violate without a sufficient showing of proper
justification. The significance of Griswold lies in its foregoing of
these disparate lines of development into an integrated and broader
right to privacy.
So there are really three different kinds of constitutional privacy. At various times, the Supreme Court has chosen to employ
individually these three provisions of the Bill of Rights (i.e., the
to the adoption of the amendment manifest concern for the expense and inconvenience of
boarding troops, not disrupting domestic privacy. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 751 (Gales & Seaton
eds. 1834). Finally, it has been suggested that the third amendment is obsolete and anachronistic in contemporary American life. See R. RUTLAND, THE BmT OF THE BILL OF R GHTS 229
(1955).
18. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
19. For a complete discussion of the ninth amendment's role in protecting privacy, see
Clark, The Ninth Amendment and ConstitutionalPrivacy, 5 U. TOL. L. Rlv. 83 (1973).
20. 381 U.S. at 485.
21. For some interesting contemporary reactions to the Griswold decision, see Symposium on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 197-288 (1965).
22. These elements are discussed in great detail in Clark, supra note 4 at 841-81.
23. A good example is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
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first, fourth, and fifth amendments), in order to safeguard some
particular aspect of privacy. On occasion, usually in situations involving free speech, several of these individual guarantees may be
combined mutually reinforcing each other, to produce an "umbrella" effect. 24 And finally, in the most infrequently employed
approach, the Court may utilize the Griswold composite approach,
harnessing a troika of the three amendments to afford the broadest
protection of constitutional privacy. 5
In the analysis that follows, it is argued that, in the Supreme
Court's attempts to protect privacy, the manner in which it employs
the fourth or fifth amendments'O-whether individually or as
building blocks to support either the "umbrella" or composite conceptions of constitutional privacy-finds justification in the historical antecedents of those amendments. Therefore, the precedents
relied upon by the Supreme Court to support the Griswold decision
are, in turn, buttressed by the English and American historical
antecedents of the fourth and fifth amendments. The concept of
constitutional privacy is, then, but another example of the continuity of Anglo-American legal development, growing and evolving over
time to meet new problems. Consequently, the origins of the Constitution's determination to protect privacy can be traced far back into
English and American history.
II.

PRIVACY INHERING IN THE PLACE: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
ANTECEDENTS

The most crucial provision of the Constitution protecting privacy, from the standpoint of historical intent as well as subsequent
evolution through judicial interpretation, is clearly the fourth
amendment. This fundamental ban upon "unreasonable" searches
24. E.g., in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the issue was whether the state
could punish the mere possession of obscene matter within the privacy of the home. In
striking down this action, the Court reinforced its first amendment position recognizing the
right to receive information and ideas by invoking the fourth amemdment privacy of location
as being essential for implementing free speech. See Katz, Privacy and Pornography:Stanley
v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 203.
25. In addition to Griswold, the Court has employed the composite approach only twice,
both in areas related to contraception. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), relating
to the availability of contraceptives for unmarried persons; and the abortion decisions, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). It seems likely, however, given
the increasing need to protect privacy in the future from the continual threats of technology
and the incessant governmental need for information, that the composite right will be applied
in additional areas in the future.
26. By contrast, the use of the first amendment to protect privacy seems to have been
a most recent development, evolving out of the cold war security pressures of the 1940's and
1950's. This development is comprehensively discussed in Clark, supra note 4 at 841-56.

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

and seizures is predicated upon the premise that to breach the privacy of the individual's home and curtilage is an extraordinary action; one that requires a number of safeguards to be satisfied before
it can be undertaken. That judicially-authorized warrants must first
be obtained, where practicable, is a most basic procedure designed
to limit governmental intrusions of privacy to those considered both
necessary and justified. From the common law heritage of the
amendment, through its drafting and incorporation into the Constitution, and continuing throughout its construction by the Supreme
Court, the concept of privacy has time upon time been demonstrated to be central. And this is most important since any constitutional right to privacy, whether based upon individual amendments
or a Griswold composite approach, must be anchored to this amendment.
In any analysis of the fourth amendment and its relationship
to privacy, a discussion of English constitutional history serves more
than to simply define a background against which the investigation
of the American development can proceed. For, in fact, the Supreme
Court has consistently turned to the English constitutional experience as a direct source of illumination as to the amendment's intended scope and purposes. As Antieau has observed: "Particularly
in determining procedural rights under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has made recourse to common-law precedents ...
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is to be understood in the light of the great common law case
of Entick v. Carrington." Hence, the antecedent English experience in part defines the meaning of the fourth amendment, and for
some Justices, such as Felix Frankfurter, 28 history becomes the
determining factor in resolving issues under the amendment.
Clearly, the fourth amendment was specifically drafted in order to
meet certain reservations the founders held concerning the proper
sphere of governmental power. These concerns were based largely
upon a legacy of adverse experiences manifested in both English and
colonial legal history.
A.

The Common Law Heritage

The most vital elements of English constitutional development
which bear directly upon the fourth amendment concern the issuance of general warrants. Beginning in the 16th century reign of the
C. ANTIEAU, 11 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 717 (1968).
See generally, Handler, The Fourth Amendment, Federalism, and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter,8 SYRACUSE L. REv. 166 (1957).
27.
28.
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Tudors, these warrants-specifying in detail neither the things to be
seized nor stating an expiration date for its authority-were seized
upon as convenient tools to aid in the enforcement of printing regulation acts. Printing had been introduced into England as early as
1476. It was not until 1528, however, that any serious regulation was
undertaken, when, during the reign of Henry VIII, the amount of
printed material in circulation had vastly increased to become a
societal influence." Not only was the prevalence of printed matter
significant, but the fact that increasingly controversial political and
religious matters were being discussed provided the impetus for the
initial forms of regulation.
The first steps toward regulation of printing were implemented
under royal prerogative alone. Initially, efforts were made to reduce
the importation of foreign printed matter, to appoint certain individuals as royal printers, to induce cooperation from other printers
by granting monopolies, and finally to establish licensing requirements for those seeking to publish. A crucial force encouraging a
comprehensive system of printing regulation was the Catholic ecclesiastical authorities seeking to blunt the force of Protestant propaganda. 0 Orginally the ecclesiastics had resorted to buying up offending publications, requiring licenses backed with the sanction of
excommunication, or unleashing their own counter-propaganda.
Generally their efforts, being based primarily upon the power of
excommunication alone, were not successful since Protestants circulating religious tracts were hardly worried about excommunication.
This led the churchmen to seek the assistance of Henry VIII.
At this time (1529) Henry was still engaged in trying to convince the Pope to annul his marriage and was therefore quickly won
over to a program of printing regulation which would endear him to
the papacy. Under ecclesiastic guidance, Henry promulgated an
index of prohibited books fifteen years in advance of the continental
index. Procedures for arrest and fines were established, with royal
authorities aiding the religious in hunting out and suppressing the
undesired religious publications. The initial system proved unsuccessful due to apathy on the part of the administering governmental
officials leading to lax enforcement and encouraging Henry to adopt
a program of licensing for all printers in 1530.1
29.

For an effective discussion of the printing regulations, see W. HoLDswoRT,

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

30.

The most complete discussion of these efforts to license religious and political print-

ing, including use of the general warrant, is found in F. SIEBERT,
ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1965).
31.

VI A

360-72 (2d ed. 1937).

Id. at 44.

-
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The next stage in printing regulation came about in 1535. At
this time Henry, having realized that the Pope would never grant
his divorce petition, had displaced the Roman Catholic Church with
his own Anglican church. He then utilized this licensing and regulatory framework to build up his Anglican church and, correspondingly, to undermine the remnants of organized Catholicism. By 1538
Henry had added regulations designed to stamp out "seditious opinions" and printing censorship had grown to include the politically
undesirable as well as the religious. The apparatus of enforcement
was still basically licensing provisions, with administration now
being wholly placed in the hands of governmental officials.
With the assumption of the throne by Elizabeth (1558), the
general aims and methods of censorship continued. The major contribution of Elizabeth, in the Injunction of 1559, was to turn over
the great body of administration to a private guild-like organization
of the printers, the Stationers' Company.32 In return for certain
exclusive privileges and other monopoly benefits, the Stationers'
Company undertook to supervise the printers in London. The company and its agents were delegated an almost unlimited power to
search and seize. The charter of incorporation emphasized the broad
authority granted:
it shall be lawful for the Master and Keepters or Wardens . . . and
their successors for the time being to make search whenever it shall
please them in any place, shop, house, chamber, or building of any
printer, binder or bookseller whatever within our kingdom of England
or the dominions of the same of or for any books or things printed, or
to printed, and to seize, take, hold, bum, or turn to the proper use of
the. . . community, all and several those books and things which are
or shall be printed contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation made or to be made.3
The logic of having the printers regulate their own industry seemed
to be a masterful strategy. They would be the best equipped to
effectively police their fellows, and at one stroke several of the worst
offenders of the past were transformed into officials charged with
administration of the new requirements. By effectively searching
out illegal printing, the Stationers' Company would in effect be
protecting it own monopoly. Furthermore, printing was confined to
London (save for the university presses at Oxford. and Cambridge),
all presses had to be registered, and licensing power was retained
by ecclesiastical authorities.
32. See W. HoLwswoaTH, supra note 29, at 362-64 for a discussion of this unique guild.
33. Quoted in F. SiaaEwr, supra note 30, at 87.
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The initial Elizabethan regulations proved ineffective. The
main reason was that the Stationers' Company was rent with dispute over the monopolies and special privileges granted to some of
its members." This led to the proclamation of a Star Chamber
Decree in 1556 which was the most ambitious and comprehensive
scheme of regulation yet, continuing in operation until 1637. Preeminent among its provisions was an affirmation of the virtually unlimited powers of search and seizure suggested under earlier frameworks of regulation. The Stationers' Company and its agents were
authorized "to open all packs and trunks of papers and books
brought into the country, to search in any warehouse, shop, or any
other place where they suspected a violation of the laws of printing
to be taking place, to seize the books printed contrary to law and
bring the offenders before the Court of High Commission.3 However, joint responsibility for enforcement of the decree was vested
in ecclesiastical officials, who had the authority to license all books
published and to determine the number of presses required. Violators of the decree would be punished by the Ecclesiastical Court of
High Commission.31 "The decree," notes Landynski, "even required
that printers set up their presses in places that would be readily
accessible to the searchers. '3
It was during the reign of James I (1603-1625) that the writ of
assistance, or general search warrant, attained a position of great
importance. 8 These warrants, so named because they charged all
the king's officers with assisting those executing the warrant, had
first been successfully used in the customs service, and as a convenience by the Privy Council and Star Chamber for general law enforcement. These writs simply empowered the bearer to search any
place he believed illegal materials might be found. Such writs were
later used to the foremost by Charles 1 (1625-1649) in seeking to rule
by royal prerogative alone. These warrants were, however, more like
the French lettres de cachet, in that they called for imprisoning the
named person for no specific offense other than the displeasure of
the monarch. Such extreme methods led to the forced signing of the
Petition of Right in 1628 outlawing such practices. But in 1629,
seeking to enforce "tonnage and poundage" requirements which
34.
35.

Id.
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 25 (1937).
36. For a discussion of the High Commission, see M. RABN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 105-06 (1936).
37. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 22 (1966).

38.

See N. LASSON, supra note 35, at 28.
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Parliament had refused to pass, the Privy Council fully utilized
general warrants to allow the searching of any vessels, warehouses
and trunks. In addition, use of the general warrants for censorship
purposes was also common. For example, a 1637 Star Chamber
at any time of day or night in any place
provision allowed 3search
9
fit.
saw
official
the
The continued efforts of Charles to rule by royal prerogative,
rather than in cooperation with the lawmaking authority of Parliament led to the rise of the Long Parliament (1640), which would
effectively challange the authority of the monarchy. Initial steps in
seeking to curtail the king's prerogatives led to the abolition of the
Star Chamber-the monarch's primary enforcement agency-in
1641. The Star Chamber had also been instrumental in press regulation, and its extinction left the printing industry relatively free of
governmental oversight. Divided authority between monarchy and
Parliament, coupled with internal divisions within Parliament itself, discouraged the Stationers' Company from continuing the vigorous policy of policing the printers. 0
It soon became evident that the Long Parliament was no more
willing to expose itself to printed criticisms and attacks than had
been the monarchy. For three years, 1640-1643, the newly liberated
printers produced an avalanche of tracts and books criticizing the
government in the most severe tones. This led to firm action by
Parliament in 1643, the Ordinance for the Regulation of Printing.'
This act was essentially a continuation of the previous methods of
printing regulations, with the Stationers' Company once more being
vested with drastically broad and ill-defined powers of search and
seizure. The licensing system continued, with the Presbyterian clerics and Parliament replacing the Episcopal and royal censors, and
Parliament superceding the High Commission as the agent for into
flicting punishment. This arsenal of censoring devices continued
42
period.
Interregnum
the
of
remainder
the
during
be utilized
The restoration of the monarchy in 1661 again brought new
legislation to suppress written dissent and criticism. It was this
Licensing Act of 1662 which extended the power of search to King's
Messengers armed with warrants from a Secretary of State. General
warrants became a valuable tool "for the better discovering of print39. Id. at 32.
40. See F. SnoERT, supra note 30, at 166-67.
41. See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 370-72.
42. These printing regulations prompted Milton to produce his famous AREOPAGMCA
(1644), one of the most striking defenses of freedom of thought and communication found in
Anglo-American legal history.
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ing in corners without license." Messengers so armed with this warrant were, in Jenks language, "empowered to take with them constables or such other assistance as they shall see fit, and at any time
they shall think fit, to search all houses and shops where they shall
know, or on some probable reason suspect, any unlicensed printing
to be going on. ' 43 The degree of precision exhibited in these warrants
varied from complete particularization to the most general terms."
Such warrants continued to be issued after the expiration of the act
in 1694, but they manifested more detail as to persons to be arrested, premises to be searched, and objects to be seized.
During the 18th century, with which this discussion is vitally
concerned because of its proximity to the drafting of the fourth
amendment, prosecution for seditious libel became the foremost
tool for press regulation. The Glorious Revolution (1688) had,
among other things, ended the presence of general warrants in other
areas of criminal prosecution outside of printing regulation. Initially, according to Landynski, the virtually ceaseless evolution of
broad search and seizure powers was narrowed as part of efforts to
control abusive enforcement of taxing regulations."5 In fact, it was
in reaction to the 1763 cider tax and its drastic enforcement provisions that Pitt uttered his famous statement:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of
the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow
through it-the storm may enter-the rain may enter-but the King
of England cannot enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of
that ruined tenement. 46
Generally, from this point on, English legislation was not so lavish
in granting broad powers of search and seizure.47
Particularly important in establishing a countervailing philosophy limiting broad powers of search and seizure were the common
law courts. 48 In the forefront of this development were renowned
43. E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 277 (1912).
44. A typical warrant authorized the bearer to "seize all seditious books and libels
and
to apprehend the authors, contrivers, printers, publishers, and dispensers of them"
and to
"search any house, shop, printing room, chamber, warehouse, [etc.]
for seditious, scandalous
or unlicensed pictures, books, or papers, to bring away or deface the same, and the
letter
press, taking away all the copies and to search for and proceed against all printers,
authors,
publishers, or dispensers of the same." F. SIEBERT, supra note 30, at 254.

45. See J.

LANDYNSKI,

supra note 37, at 25.

46. A good discussion of Pitt's quote and its relevance to privacy is found in Douglas'
dissent in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959).
47. See N. LAssON, supra note 35, at 40.
48. See E. JENKS, supra note 43, at 335, and W. HoLDswoar, supra note 29, Volume
V, at 658.

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

individuals like Matthew Hale and Coke. Coke declared flatly that
the common law gave no authority "to break open any man's house
4
to search for a felon or stolen goods wither in the day or night."
50
Although Hale disagreed, feeling search warrants were necessary
in time of high crimes, he maintained that those warrants had to
meet procedural standards of particularity which would make any
general warrants void. Arrest and search upon suspicion were not
enough; Hale demanded probable cause be demonstrated sufficiently to convince an impartial judicial officer.
Even though the printing regulations had technically expired in
1695, the Secretaries of State continued to exercise the authority to
5
issue general warrants upon the basis of "ill-defined customs." '
This seemed to be the safest course, since Parliament perceived a
growing revulsion against the concept of general warrants. It was
also reluctant to entrust either party with the explicit authority to
control printing. Since the secretaries continued to issue the warrants only slightly more particular than the earlier writs of assistance, the opportunity arose for the judiciary to decisively strip such
actions of legitimacy in several key cases. The cases grew not out of
efforts to ferret out unlicensed publications, i.e., prior restraint, but
rather out of the new tool for press regulation involving the use of
seditious libel as a device to punish after publication. The basic
issue to be decided was whether the common law standards for a
search warrant (involving stolen goods) or the statutory model of the
general warrant would prevail."
The first case involved John Wilkes, publisher of a journal
called the North Briton. In one issue of his journal, Wilkes had
criticized the king's efforts in connection with the unpopular Treaty
of Paris of 1763, doing so in an anonymous and most insolent fashion. George III insisted upon prosecution of the offenders, and Lord
Halifax, the Secretary of State, authorized the issuance of a warrant
for the searching out and arrest of the authors, printers, and publishers of the offending issue. Among those arrested upon this basis
was Wilkes who not only refused to answer questions as to his role
in the affair, but later sued Wood, a subordinate of Halifax, for
trespass in breaking into his house and seizing his private papers
49.

Quoted in J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 37, at 26.
M. HALE, II HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 (1847). See W.

HOLDSWORTH,
SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 132-45 (1966) for a discussion of Hale.
51. D. KErn, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, 310 (8th ed.

50.

1966).
52.

T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTREPRETATION 24-26 (1969).
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while Wilkes was incarcerated within the Tower of London.5 3
At trial, Wilkes argued that the general warrants were illegal,
and further that the injury which arose, i.e., "the promulgation of
our most private concerns, affairs of our most secret personal nature,"5 4 was so severe that no complete reparation could ever be
made. The facts were essentially not in dispute-the sole question
was the legality of the original warrant issued by Lord Halifax. In
summing up the evidence, and charging the jury, the Lord Chief
Justice Pratt indicated precisely where he stood:
The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons'
houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, upon a general
warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away,
and where no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and
therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may change to fall ...
It is my opinion the office precedents, which had been produced since
the Revolution, are no justification of a practice in itself illegal, and
contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitution; though its
having been the constant practice of the office, might fairly be
pleaded in mitigation of the damages."5
Not surprisingly after this charge, the jury found damages in favor
of Wilkes in the amount of a thousand pounds.
In Leach v. Money,56 decided in 1765, and also growing out of
the North Briton affair, an even firmer position was taken by the
common law judges. Here Lord Mansfield and the entire court of the
King's Bench held the general warrant to be illegal. And, as Holdsworth indicates, even though the case was disposed of on another
ground, Mansfield's statement left no doubt as to where the common law judges stood vis-a-vis the general warrants issue: 7
It is not fit, that the receiving or judging of the information should
be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge;
and should give certain directions to the officer. This is so upon
reason and convenience. Then as to the authorities-Hale and all
others hold such an uncertain warrant void; and there is no case or
book to the contrary. It is said, "that the usage has been so; and that
many such have been issued, since the Revolution, down to this
time." But a usage, to grow into a law, ought to be a general usage,
53. G. SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 408 (1955).
54. See Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 1154 (1763).
55. Id. at 1167.
56. 19 How. St. Tr. 1021 (1765).
57. See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, Volume X, at 668.
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communiter usitata et approbata;which after a long continuance, it

would be mischevious to overturn. This is only the usage of a particuto the usage of all other justices and conservalar office, and contrary
58
peace.
tors of the
These two landmark decisions firmly established the principle that
general warrants were clearly against the premises of common law,
a stark exception to the general rules governing search warrants,
and could not be sustained simply as a customary practice of the
Secretary of State.
The third case growing out of the North Briton episode, Entick
v. Carrington,51 is especially important, since the Supreme Court
has repeatedly quoted its language as the primary guide to the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Here the issue was not strictly
that of a general warrant, for although it was general as to Entick's
papers, the warrant specified his house and was served on the day
of its issuance. Rather, the basic question was whether a person's
private papers could be lawfully seized when he was charged with
seditious libel. As in the previous cases, the facts were not in dispute-the issue resolved itself into a basic question of law. Entick's
counsel succinctly summed up the fundamental importance of the
case:
[Tihis would be worse than the Spanish inquisition; for ransacking
a man's secret drawers and boxes, to come at evidence against him,
is like racking his body to come at his secret thoughts. The warrant
is to seize all the plaintiff's books and papers without exception, and
carry them before Lord Halifax. what? Has a Secretary of State a
right to see all a man's private letters of correspondence, family conand if it
cerns, trade and business? This would be monstrous indeed;
0
country.
this
in
live
to
endure
were lawful, no man could
Once more Pratt, who was now Lord Chief Justice Camden,
rejected the arguments made on the grounds of necessity and long
usage. Going straight to the crucial issue in the case, the indiscriminate rummaging through one's private papers to find supposedly
seditious matter, he declared:
[I]f the point should be determined in favour of the jurisdiction, the
secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be
thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever
58.
59.
60.

19 How. St. Tr. at 1026-27.
19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
Id. at 1038.
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the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a
person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel.'
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear
an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be
guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried
away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the
trespass. .

.

. Where is the written law that gives any magistrate

such a power? I can safely answer, there is none; and therefore it is
too much for us without such authority to pronounce a practice legal,
which would be subversive of all the comforts of society.62
This unequivocal stand by the high court encouraged increased
public feeling on the issue of general warrants. Pitt, who had issued
such warrants while Secretary of State in 1760, undertook the leadership in 1764 of the efforts to persuade the Commons to denounce
general warrants as illegal, except for situations in which Parliament might itself authorize the search. 3 This allowed the use of
general warrants in enforcement procedures against smuggling, authorized previously, to continue unimpaired. And it is this situation,
the use of general warrants in the customs service, which played a
vital role in the colonial experience immediately preceeding the
drafting of the fourth amendment.
B.

Writs of Assistance in America

As previously indicated, after 1764 public opinion in England
had forced a reduction in the potential usefulness of the general
warrant, restricting its area of application almost wholly to customs
enforcement. Within England itself, the narrow utilization of the
general warrant affected few individuals, resulting in a reduction of
friction. In the colonies, however, where there was much greater
involvement in shipping and smuggling, many more people were
directly touched by customs measures and the methods settled upon
to enforce them.
The coming of the Great War (1754-1763) ended the general
period of salutary neglect, with its loose colonial control and direction from London. Although fewer new customs regulations were
enacted, clearly these and the existent statutes-such as the Mollases Act of 1733-were meant to be enforced. The Americans, in the
61.
62.
63.
19 How.

Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1066.
See N. LAssoN, supra note 35, at 48 and the note appended to the Entick opinion,
St. Tr. 1029, 1075.
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habit of trading freely irrespective of customs regulations, continued
to trade with the French in spite of the war. As Gipson has written:
"From available evidence it is abundantly clear that illicit trade
with the American colonies sustained and prolonged the French
military and naval effort."" Strong pressure was applied by Pitt and
his ministers in London against colonial officials to snuff out this
source of assistance to the French war effort.
One principal tool seized upon by the customs officials was the
writ of assistance. The colonial writs were similar to the English
variety, in that they were drawn in the most general of terms and
were active so long as the reigning sovereign lived; necessarily they
had to be renewed within six months after his death. The writs
authorized a customs official to search any place where he had
reason to believe illegal goods were stored and he could solicit the
aid of a court official to gain access. Since these warrants were not
returnable upon service, they constituted a continuing license to
search at will during the reign of that particular sovereign. Such
writs had been issued by the Superior Court in Boston in 1775, 1758,
1759, and 1760.5 Before that, the Governor had issued them upon
his own authority and, as Lasson indicated, the Massachusetts legislature itself had, between 1748 and 1756, authorized broad powers
of search for collectors of provincial duties. But after the manifestation of public resistance, the legislature modified the law in 1756 to
6
require special warrants instead of the more general kind.
Obviously, the writs of assistance were not novel tools in American customs enforcement; nonetheless in 1761 a case arising out of
their use became a colonial cause celbre. Although the legal basis
for the issuance of such writs was not at all precise, customary
7
practice had filled in gaps within the legal foundation. In 1760, the
death of George II necessitated that new applications for the writs
be made to the Superior Court of Massachusetts within six months.
A number of Boston merchants seized upon this opportunity to
oppose the issuance of new writs, engaging James Otis, Jr. and
Oxenbridge Thatcher to argue the point in Superior Court. However, before the case could be heard, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court, Samuel Sewall, died. Although Sewall had issued writs
GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION 30 (1954).
The most complete history of the writ of assistance's use in Massachuetts and other
colonies is found in Gray, Writs of Assistance, Appendix I in J. QUINCY, REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUETrS BAY, 17611762, 396-540 (c. 1865).
66. See N. LASSON, supra note 35, at 56.
67. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 37, at 32-33.

64. L.
65.
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in the past, he had on several occasions remarked as to the doubtful
legal basis for the warrants. His replacement was Thomas Hutchenson, chosen because of his strong support for the Crown's policy of
colonial regulation, and it was before him that the case was argued.
The case attracted widespread public interest, and John Adams
records that the council chamber was crowded with government
officials, merchants, members of the Boston bar, and dozens of interested spectators crammed into every available space.18 After
rather staid and learned legal arguments by Jeremiah Gridley as
Attorney for the Crown, and Oxenbridge Thatcher in response, Otis
preferred to make an emotion-filled presentation which Adams suggests "breathed into this nation the breath of life." 9 "This writ is
against the fundamental principles of law,"70 declared Otis flatly.
The sanctity of a man's home was one of the foremost protections
of English liberty; and violation of that sanctity must only come
through a highly prescribed judicial process designed to justify the
proposed intrusion and to limit it as narrowly as possible. The English constitution and the common law-not vague statutes or customs from the past-must be determinative of the issue. The principles of natural equity must prevail over contrary laws. Such a writ
of assistance:
appears to me the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law,
that ever was found in an English lawbook. .

.

. I will admit that

writs of one kind may be legal; that is, special writs, directed to
special officials and to search certain houses etc. specifically set forth
in the writ, may be granted . . . upon oath made before the Lord
Treasurer . . . you will find adjudicated that special warrants only

are legal.7
So vigorous was Otis' argument, prompting obvious responsiveness from the assembled listeners, that Hutchenson (fearing his
brethren might be swayed) chose to continue the case another term
until definitive legal information could be obtained from London.
After correspondence with the provincial agent in London, not the
68. See C. ADAMS, II THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, Appendix I 521-25 (1850) for Adams'
notes on the Otis argument; see also Adams' letter to William Tudor, Id. Volume X, at
244-49. For historical discussion see C. VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
175-79 (1922), and Skinner, Writ of Assistance, 21 TORONTO U. L. FACULTY REv. 26, 29-32
(1963).
69. See C. ADAMS, supra note 68, Volume X; the best reconstruction of the argument is
found in P. SMrrH, I JOHN ADAMS 52-56 (1922).
70. See C. ADAMS, supra note 68, Volume II, Appendix I, at 521.
71. Id. at 522-24.
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72
Attorney General as might be expected, Hutchenson issued a new
writ in 1761. As this process was taking place, Otis' arguments had
been circulated widely helping to maintain public interest at a high
level.
In 1762, the Massachusetts legislature outlawed general warrants and authorized only special warrants. This was understandable, since several legislators, including Otis, had been elected upon
the basis of the Otis position on the writs. However, the Governor
voided the measure. Apparently, from 1762 through 1765 little opposition to the execution of the warrants was experienced and Gray
indicates that fourteen were issued by the Superior Court during the
period. 73 With the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765, however, the
controversy flared up once more. Hutchenson's house was burned
because of his role in sustaining the warrants. Groups of citizens
appeared wherever customs officials tried to enforce a writ, and this
continued even after Parliament passed legislation (Townshend
74
Revenue Acts of 1767) which placed their legality beyond doubt.
Such episodes as the Malcom Affair in 1766-where custom officials
armed with a general warrant were forcibly denied entrance into a7
house-continued to cause friction and sustain public interest. 1
Nevertheless, the courts in Massachusetts and New Hampshire continued to issue the writs, even though their enforcement was for the
most part unsuccessful. Recent research indicates that, the Massachusetts episode rather than having fired public interest throughout
the colonies on the issue of general warrants, was merely one example of similar phenomena throughout the colonies. Every colony
experienced some degree of controversy over the warrants, especially after the Townshend Revenue Acts in 1767, which specifically
granted colonial courts the authority to issue the writs of assistance.
As Dickerson states, "In this later controversy, writs of assistance
became an issue throughout the colonies, involving nearly every
judge and prominent lawyer in America outside of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire. ' 77 He suggests that Virginia rather than Mas72. Interestingly enough, based upon Foreign Office Records, Wolkins suggests that the
Attorney General in London informed Hutchenson that, legally, the warrants were of doubtful
validity. This led Hutchenson to seek authorization from the colonial secretary. Wolkins,
[hereinafter
Danial Malcom and the Writs of Assistance, 1924 Mass. Hist. Soc'y Proc. 5-6.
cited as Wolkins].
73. See Gray, supra note 65, at 422-34.
74. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 37, at 36.
75. See generally, Wolkins, supra note 72.
76. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40-75 (R. Morris ed. 1939).
77. Id. at 48.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/2

19771

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF PRIVACY

sachusetts took the lead in search and seizure protection, as witnessed by the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776.18 This clause, Article
X, was replicated by other states including Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, Maryland, and eventually Massachusetts. The significant
point is that public attention, informed by many sources, had been
focused upon an issue that would directly influence the framers of
the fourth amendment.
C.

The Drafting of the FourthAmendment
The intention behind the fourth amendment becomes more evident when its historical background is understood, and accounts of
its drafting process make clear that the sanctity of the individual
and the privacy of his home were primary considerations in the
minds of the authors of the amendment. The forces responsible for
the addition of a bill of rights to the Constitution have been discussed elsewhere. 7" For the present, it need only be indicated that
the absence of specific language within the Constitution banning
the issuance of general warrants, as well as the lack of other specific
types of protections for individual rights, led George Mason and
other influential politicians to press for the incorporation into the
document of specific guarantees.
Madison, who agreed to present a list of proposed amendments,
drew upon a great many factors in drafting the document that would
become the fourth amendment. In addition to the historical considerations surrounding the use and development of writs of assistance,
several other critical developments bore directly upon Madison's
perspective. Among these was the first organic act to specifically
ban what could be termed unreasonable searches and seizures-the
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 referred to previously. This
general statement had served as the pattern for similar declarations
in every constitution, with several of the states even incorporating
Virginia's precise language."s In at least one case, during the confederation period, a state Superior Court in South Carolina had thrown
out a larceny prosecution because the evidence utilized in the trial
78. Art. X reads:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search
suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or seize any person or persons
not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence,
are grevious and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
79. See Clark, The Ninth Amendment and ConstitutionalPrivacy, 5 U. TOL. L. REv.
83, 87-91 (1973).
80. C. ANTIEAU, RIGHTS OF OUR FATHERS 99 (1968) and N. LASSON, supra note 35, at 81.
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had been secured by a general warrant.', Another factor influencing
Madison was the fact that a number of state constitutional ratifying
conventions had drafted proposed amendments to protect individual rights, most based upon the similar provisions in their own state
constitutions which in turn were modeled upon the Virginia Declaration of Rights. The Pennsylvania convention's minority report
suggested a version which read:
That warrants unsupported by evidence, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or
to seize any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly
eidescribed, are grievous and oppressive, and shall not be granted
2
ther by the magistrates of the federal government or others.
Five states favored such an amendment, and so indicated by proposing their own versions.
Madison's proposed amendment clearly reflected the influence
of both past historical experience and the specific proposals of the
state ratifying conventions and the state bills of rights:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.3
It is interesting to note the broader protection included in this measure as compared to the Virginia Declaration, which had only barred
general warrants. In Madison's draft, the requirements for oath or
affirmation and the general principle of security from unreasonable
search and seizure were also included."' The proposed text was submitted to a Committee of Eleven along with Madison's other
amendments.
Apparently there was feeling within the committee that Madison's proposal was directed only at improper warrants. "The observation may be made that the language of the proposal did not purport to create a right to be secure from unreasonable searches5 and
seizures but merely stated it as a right which already existed." The
81.

Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787); see R.

OF RIGHTS 101 (1962).

RUTLAND,THE BIRTH OF THE BILL

82. The complete document is found in E. DUMBAULD, supra note 17, at 173.
83. I ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834).
proposal in
84. N. LASSON, supra note 35, at 96, relates this back to Patrick Henry's
the Virginia Convention.
85. Id. at 100 n.77.
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committee's version read:
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.88
When the House met to discuss the amendments, Eldridge Gerry,
on behalf of the committee, moved for a reworking of the language
so that the proposed version was augmented with a key clause: "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ."s would
not be infringed.
The Annals then indicate a most interesting point. Representative Benson objected to the language "by warrants issuing," suggesting that the point would be carried further by including "and
no warrant shall issue." As the Annals record, "The question was
put on this motion, and lost by a considerable majority." Hence the
language now found within the fourth amendment was, paradoxically, specifically rejected by the House."8 Apparently Benson, who
headed the three man committee which arranged the amendments
for presentation to the Senate, reported his own proposed text instead of that passed by the House. This was the form of the present
wording of the amendment, to which the Senate assented and which
Congress submitted to the states for ratificiation10
Lasson attributes great significance to this action, contending
that this language implied two basic points. First, according to this
view, a specific general right of security from unreasonable search
and seizure was recognized and given sanction. Second, a warrant
procedure was prescribed, although the intent of the amendment is
not limited merely to describing valid warrants. It is, in fact, a
statement of principle designed to protect the privacy of the individual and his affairs.9'
Landynski continues the discussion on this point from another
perspective, noting that nowhere within the fourth amendment is
86. I ANNALS OF Cong. 783 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834).
87. Id.
88. See Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 H Av. L. REV. 361, 366 n.30
(1921).
89. See N. LASSON, supra note 35, at 101-04 for a discussion of this point.
90. Later, both the House and Senate formally voted to submit the present text to the
states, though it remains unclear whether the discrepancy was noted.
91. See N. LAssoN, supra note 35, at 103.
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the term "unreasonable" defined; therefore three interpretations of
the interrelationship of the two clauses are possible:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant
requirements specified in the second clause; (2) that the first clause
provides an additional restriction by implying that some searches
may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible, even when
made under warrant; or (3) that the first clause provides an additional search power, authorizing the judiciary to find some searches
"reasonable" even when carried out without warrant. 2
Landynski's interpretation suggests that the first part of the clause
"recognized as already existing a right to freedom from arbitrary
governmental invasion of privacy and did not seek to create or confer such a right. 9' 3 The first clause was designed to emphasize the
importance of fulfilling the procedural requirements specified in the
second, while "the second clause, in turn, defines and interprets the
first, telling us the kind of search that is not 'unreasonable,' and
therefore not forbidden, namely, the one carried out under the safe' Under this reasoning, the first or second
guards there specified." 94
alternatives are in accord with the intended purpose of the amendment, though Landynski prefers the second.
D.

Early Supreme Court Construction

The Supreme Court's early pronouncements upon the fourth
amendment established the validity of both the first and second of
Landynski's theses. In Ex parteJackson,15 the Court announced the
principle that "letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as
fully guarded from examination and inspection. . . as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles."',
Justice Field's argument was that the fourth amendment's protection of security in one's papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to those papers wherever they may be; first class
mail can only be examined in the same fashion as it could be in the
home-via warrant. Therefore, postal inspectors like other governmental agents cannot "invade the secrecy of letters" in other than
the prescribed constitutional fashion. Even at this early point, the
Court so strongly recognized a need to protect individual privacy
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See J.

LANDYNSKI, supra

note 37, at 42-43.

Id. at 43.

Id.
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
Id. at 733.
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that it went beyond the common law concept of trespass."
8 would later prove
Another early case, Boyd v. United States,"
to be one of the most significant pronouncements on the fourth
amendment ever to be handed down. The case centered around one
provision of the federal Customs Revenue Act of 1874. This section
of the statute provided that upon proper notice from a court, a
defendant in fraud proceedings could be required to produce in
court specified papers and documents of importance in the case. If,
however, such papers were not produced, then the allegations made
against the defendant in question were to be considered confessed
and affirmed. Obviously, a defendant under these conditions had
little choice but to produce the requested papers.
In writing the opinion, Mr. Justice Bradley relied heavily upon
British precedent on search and seizure, especially the case of
99 According to Bradley, Lord Camden, in
Entick v. Carrington.
rendering his opinion supporting Entick had produced a "landmark of
liberty" with words that were most influential upon the framers of
the Bill of Rights. 00 However, for Bradley the principles laid down
in that case "the very essence of constitutional liberty and security"
reach further than the concrete facts (i.e., physical invasion of the
home and the carting away of private papers). For, according to
Bradley:
They apply to all invasions, on the part of the government and its
employees, of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of
his indefeasible rights of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property, where that right had never been forfeited by his
conviction of some public offense; it is the invasion of this sacred
right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment. 9 '
Then, in the key clause of the opinion, a statement that would
lead to decades of argument among students of constitutional law,
Bradley asserts:
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a
97.

Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALF. L.

REv. 474, 482 (1961).
98. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
99. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029.

100. See E. Trimble, Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment as Interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, 41 KY. L. J. 196, 200 (1953).

101.

116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard
the Fourth and Fifth Amend2
ments run almost into each other.1
In this language, Bradley arrives at several vital conclusions
about the fourth amendment, even though the case was technically
a civil forfeiture and did not directly involve a search and seizure.
A procedure such as that outlined in the revenue statute must be
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional, first, because it violates the
intent and spirit of the fourth amendment's protection of the individual's right to privacy and security. While government has a right
to seize contraband, such as smuggled goods, it has no legitimate
claim upon one's private papers as evidence; not even the writs of
assistance had gone this far. Second, Bradley is tying the meaning
of "unreasonable" search and seizure to the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment, 0 3 for "the 'unreasonable searches
and seizures' condemned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth
amendment." Therefore, such a procedure compelling the production of papers actually forces an individual to be a witness against
himself. Hence, the presumption lies that certain types of searches
are precluded, even if executed pursuant to a fully authorized search
warrant.'0 In sum then, the Supreme Court, during the formative
early interpretations of the fourth amendment, recognized the vital
intimacy between unreasonable search and seizure and the interest
in privacy. This perspective has continued ever since in the process
rendering the fourth amendment the cornerstone to the constitutional right to privacy.'0 5
III.

ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SILENCE

As previously discussed, the constitutional right to privacy is
composed of several different Bill of Rights guarantees which protect different aspects of individual and group privacy. The first
amendment safeguards the anonymity of political belief and association, while the fourth amendment appears to be most concerned
with guarding the locus of privacy. But the most intimate aspect of
102. Id.
103. Id. at 633.
104. An interesting, but critical, analysis of this case is found in Nelson, Search and
Seizure: Boyd v. U.S., 9 A.B.A.J. 773 (1923).
105. See generally Clark supra note 4, at 856-71.
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privacy, that concerned with the mind and innermost beliefs of the
individual, is equally in need of some measure of constitutional
protection. Consequently, it is the fifth amendment's ban against
compulsory self-incrimination, or the forcing of an individual to
divulge information that only he may know, that renders the constitutional protection of privacy complete. To some, the fifth amendment's right to silence safeguards the most crucial aspect of individual privacy, that dimension of privacy which is the indispensable
ingredient of individuality and of democracy.
A.

The English Antecedents of the Fifth Amendment
Much like the origin of the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment is the product of both English constitutional history and
American colonial developments. The historical evidence, however,
is far less voluminous and explicit than that available to assist in
gaining an understanding of the fourth amendment. One fortunate
result of the McCarthy period, when many witnesses refusing to
testify before Congressional committees were being labeled "Fifth
Amendment Communists," was to encourage a significant amount
of scholarly research into the origins and purposes of the fifth
amendment. This research, coupled with the publication of Leonard
W. Levy's most significant volume, Origins of the Fifth
Amendment, 0 1 now makes it possible to obtain a somewhat clearer
and more complete understanding of the history behind the drafting
of the fifth amendment.
According to Wigmore, 10 7 the privilege against selfincrimination is the outgrowth of two historical lines of development. The first was the use in English ecclesiastical courts of an
oath ex officio. This practice simply required any person summoned
before the court, without his knowing the nature of any charges
against him, or even if he were formally charged, to answer any
questions put to him. This device proved highly effective in combating heresy. The second line of development relates to the eventual
opposition of the common law courts to this manner of posing incriminating questions. The first stage of the development began in
the thirteenth century and continued into the seventeenth; the second stage commenced in the seventeenth century and persisted into
the eighteenth.
106. L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFm AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
(1968).
107. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:Its History, 15 HARV. L. REv.
610 (1901); see also Wigmore's earlier article, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HAaV. L.
REV. 71 (1891).
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Prior to the Norman Conquest in 1066, bishops sat under
Anglo-Saxon law as judges in certain types of suits in the civil
courts. William ended this practice in 1100, confining bishops to
matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Hence, there existed two separate judicial systems, temporal and spiritual, for several centuries.
The oath ex officio appears to have been introduced on the Continent by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).
The Council's revision of canon law provided for a process in
which the judge, by virtue of his office, i.e., ex officio, conducted the
prosecution of one secretly accused of spiritual offense. The first
step in this process was to call the accused before the judge, who
administered an oath, de veritiate dicenda, which required the accused to swear that he would truthfully answer any questions put
to him. If he refused, he was held to be guilty; if he took the oath,
and his answers differed from the unknown evidence against him
supplied by anonymous accusers, he was convicted of perjury. The
frightening aspect of the oath was'that a person so sworn had absolutely no idea of what charges existed against him, or the evidence
supporting them, and any answer which was seemingly innocent
could provide a crucial ingredient in determining his guilt. The oath
proved popular during the Inquisition in ferreting out heretics, since
it gave the examining judge free play to search around in an accused's thoughts, and it became known simply as the oath ex
officio. 0,
The oath was introduced in England in 1236.09 During this
period, the ecclesiastical courts claimed wide jurisdiction over all
actions of clerics, even if they violated the criminal law, as well as
a broad range of spiritual offenses including sexual conduct, marriage, wills, and the administration of church properties. A resulting
hostile reaction to the extensive jurisdiction of the church courts,
and their use of the oath ex officio, led to De Articuli Cleri' 0 being
enacted in the early 1300's. The statute narrowed the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction (and the use of the oath) over laymen by limiting it to
matrimonial and testamentary matters. Writs of prohibition could
be obtained from the common law courts to block any attempts by
the church courts to enlarge their jurisdiction over laymen. There
was, at this time, no objection to the oath itself; there existed only
a desire to circumscribe its use by the ecclesiastic courts."'
108. See L. LEV, supra note 106, at 22-24.
109. Huard, The Fifth Amendment-An Evaluation, 42 GEO. L. J. 345, 358 (1954).
110. ProhibitioFormata de Statuto Articuli cleri, I STATUTES OF THE REALM 209 (Luders
et al. 1811-1828).
111. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949).
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In reality, the statute did not end the use by the ecclesiastical
courts of the oath in heresy trials, where it was most effective.
Equally important, the King's Council (forerunner of the House of
Lords), the Privy Council, and the Star Chamber, used an oath very
similar to the oath ex officio. They took up criminal cases upon the
suggestion of private accusers, and "parties and witnesses could be
put under oath to tell the truth and then be subjected to inquisitorial examination." '" ' 2 Parliamentary statutes in 1351 and 1368
sought to limit the use of the oath, requiring a formal indictment
to be presented before any questioning could take place. According
to Morgan, these enactments resulted from a distaste for the inquisitorial procedure utilized." 3 They represented efforts to limit the
King's Council to the older common law forms of criminal procedure.
The church courts continued to use the oath in their efforts
(often supported by the Crown) to stamp out the teachings of Wycliff and other reformation heretics, especially during the Inquisition period, when about sixty persons were burned for their heresy
and many others were convicted of lesser degrees of heresy. That the
oath ex officio played an important role in this English inquisition
is evidenced by a passage in Tryndale's The Obedience of a Christian Man (1528), where he spoke about the tyranny of breaking into
the hearts and minds of men to compel them to swear the oath, and
thereby causing self-infamy. A more legally oriented argument was
made by the noted common law scholar, Christopher St. Germain,
in 1532.
St. Germain . . . did not argue for a general right against selfincrimination, that is, for a right to remain silent to an incriminating
question on ground that a truthful answer might furnish evidence
leading to one's conviction. No such right existed at common law.
The argument, rather, was that the inquisitional procedure, which
employed the oath ex officio, unfairly denied the defendant every
vestige of proper accusation, thereby denying him the opportunity to
defend himself."'
This statement by Levy is highly significant, since it indicates that
the opposition to the oath ex officio was not based upon any revulsion engendered by the idea of bearing witness against oneself; the
point of contention was, rather, the authority of an ecclesiastical
112.
113.
114.

See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 50.
See Morgan, supra note 111, at 5.
See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 66; see also Le Van Baumer, ChristopherSt.

Germain: The PoliticalPhilosophy of a Tudor Lawyer, 42 AM. HIST. REv. 631 (1937).
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court to demand answers to any questions whatsoever, without the
individual having been first formally charged and indicted. This
forced the hapless suspect to help accuse himself." 5 The oath continued to play a vital role through Henry VIII's reformation and the
Catholic restoration as well.
In 1558, with the Anglican Church once more firmly in control,
Elizabeth established a Court of High Commission in Causes Ecclesiastical to carry out her church policy, including jurisdiction over
heresy. The Court of High Commission was the ecclesiastical arm
of the Council."8 Another offshoot, the Star Chamber, developed
into a court of "criminal equity," designed to supplement and correct the common law courts." 7 In both of these bodies, the oath ex
officio was freely employed. Beginning in 1583, the High Commission under the stern Archbishop Whitgift began a determined effort
to destroy Puritanism. The High Commission's frequent use of the
oath ex officio led to a great public distaste for the procedure, since
the Puritans incessantly employed it as propaganda for their
cause.18 One response came from the clerk of the Privy Council,
Robert Beale, who invented the fiction that the oath violated the
Magna Carta."' In time, this would prove to be a crucial argument.
Another rejoinder was forthcoming from John Wilson who, in refusing to take the oath, declared that the common law did not allow
him to accuse himself, for this demand might cause him to reveal
"privities of mine own heart, or of my neighbours', or friends' secrets." 12 0
The use of the oath ex officio by the Star Chamber was significantly different than the procedure followed by the High Commission. Instead of forcing individuals to answer questions in ignorance
of the charges and evidence against them, the Star Chamber procedure was much more like that of a common law court. The defendant had an opportunity to see and copy the charges against him,
and within eight days thereafter to file an answer to the charge
either denying it, confessing to the accusation, or demurring. He
also pledged his willingness to answer any interrogatories (oath ex
officio) upon his answer. Thereupon, he was called in for a secret
115. Note, Self-Incrimination-HistoricalBackground of the Doctrine, 44 KY. L. REv.
124, 126 (1955).
116. See J. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS: A.D. 1485-1603, 360-62 (1930)
for a complete analysis of the ecclesiastical courts.
117. See R. RADIN, supra note 36, at 70.
118. Kemp, The Background of the Fifth Amendment in English Law: A Study of Its
Historical Implications, 1 WM. & MARY L. REV. 247, 263 (1957).
119. See L. LEvY, supra note 106 at 140.
120. Id. at 159.
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examination before an official of the court, but they were likewise
examined separately and in secrecy. With the necessary evidence
collected, a public trial took place before the court, which sat without a jury. 2 ' The danger was that the Star Chamber had the authority to dispense with this procedure in extraordinary cases, and to
proceed with a strict oath ex officio procedure designed to entrap the
defendant. As time passed, and James I ascended the throne (1603),
the Star Chamber became more inclined to utilize this summary
procedure against the Puritans, including torture to gain confesdirected against
sions,2 2 and this resulted in its sharing the criticism
23
the use of the oath by the High Commission.
It is during this period of James' reign that the second line of
development suggested by Wigmore, opposition of the common law
courts to the oath, comes into play. There is some element of dispute
as to when the common law courts first began to oppose the oaths:
Wigmore cites the sixteenth century, but Maguire begins her classic
analysis in the mid-thirteenth.' 2 It is clear, though, that the significant role of the common law courts commences in the time of James'
rule. Likewise, the House of Commons had been resisting the imposition of the oath, as part of its general effort to limit the prerogatives of the monarchy, as early as the 1580's.125 These three powerful
forces-common law courts, Commons, and the incessantly active
Puritans-all played crucial roles in the demise of the oath, but the
influence exercised by Edward Coke and the common law judges
appears to have been the crucial factor.
Coke and other common law judges sought to attack the oath
as part of an effort to confine ecclesiastical jurisdiction within its
proper limits: i.e., matters matrimonial and testamentary. Coke
2
had first opposed the oath in the 1589 case of Collier v. Collier.'
As counsel, Coke'2 argued that the High Commission had no authority to utilize the oath in a case where a wife sued her husband
for incontinency, since this matter (defamation) was neither matrimonial nor testamentary. "Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere" (no one
121. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HisT. REv. 727, 738-42 (1913).
122. Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 44 Ky. L. REv. 267, 270 (1956).
123. See Wigmore, supra note 107, at 623.
124. See Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Adminis-

tered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, in ESSAYS
HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN 199, 204 (1936).

IN HISTORY AND POLITIcAL THEORY IN

125. See Kemp, supra note 118, at 226.
126. 74 Eng. Rep. 816 (1589).
127. See generally W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 111-33 (1966) for a
discussion of Coke.
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ought to accuse himself) argued Coke, and a writ of prohibitionwas
issued.' Later, in Cawdry's case,1I Coke unsuccessfully asserted
that the High Commission had no power to imprison since its authority came only from the statutory Act of Supremacy, and the
common law banned imprisonment by church courts. The Queen's
Bench, however, rejected this position and held that the High Commission was a court established by royal prerogative and could
therefore exercise royal jurisdiction and powers in religious matters.1'3
It was after his ascension as the Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas in 1606 that Coke's role in opposing the writs became truly significant. In deciding a number of key cases affecting
the use of the oath ex officio, Coke utilized the central principle of
the supremacy of the common law. "According to this principle, the
common law courts were supreme in determining from acts of Parliament and from the customs of the realm, as found in common law
decisions, what the law was."' 3' Hence, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts would be determined by the common law courts.
In 1606, the Privy Council sought an advisory opinion from
Coke and John Popham (Chief Justice of the King's Bench) as to
whether the ecclesiastical judges might examine any person upon
the oath. The two Chief Justices responded by denying that power,
unless the articles of the charge were provided so that an accused
could know the offense with which he was charged. "No one", wrote
Coke, "either ecclesiastic or secular, ought to be examined on his
secret thoughts and opinions, but should be accused only of actual
words or deeds.' ' 2 As to laymen in church courts, the oath could
not be used except for testamentary and matrimonial causes. In
Nicholas Fuller's case,' Fuller was an attorney defending several
individuals who had refused to take the oath. His vehement arguments, including the old Magna Carta fiction, reasoning drawn from
natural law, and Coke's advisory opinion, were so caustic that he
himself was later charged with slander of the church and arrested
by the High Commission. Although Coke's court eventually rejected
his appeal for a prohibition upon the basest of political motives,
128. Randall, Sir Edward Coke and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 8
S.C.L.Q. 417, 427 (1956).
129. 77 Eng. Rep. 1, 1-47 (1591).
130. See Kemp, supra note 118, at 276-77.
131. See Randall, supra note 128, at 436.
132. See Maguire, supra note 124, at 223.
133. 77 Eng. Rep. 1322 (1607).
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Fuller's argument opposing the oath were given wide circulation.'334
In a series of cases, culminating in Burrows v. High Commission,'
Coke flatly declared the oath illegal except as applied in matters
testamentary and matrimonial.
For a number of reasons, including his opposition to the High
Commission, Coke was removed from the bench in 1616. Likewise,
other courageous common law judges were removed for political
reasons. Nevertheless, according to Levy,'" the period from 1616
through 1632 brought far less use of the oath by the High Commission. In all likelihood, the hostile pressures from the Puritans, Commons, and judges had been sufficient to discourage too frequent
recourse to the procedure. Yet paradoxically, during this entire period Coke and other opponents did not hold that the oath was illegal
as such, but only that a valid oath could be imposed by Parliamentary authority alone.'37 Increasingly, however, the idea of forcing a
person to accuse himself by the probing of his innermost thoughts
was becoming repugnant to the public consciousness.
This was dramatically indicated in the Lilburne case, which
forever did away with the oath ex officio and, in turn, gave birth to
the right against self-incrimination.' Lilburne was brought before
the Star Chamber and accused of circulating writings against certain bishops. Lilburne refused to take the oath ex officio, since he
did not want to inform on others involved in the allegedly criminal
activity. He was thereupon sentenced to pay a fine of 500 pounds.
The case became a cause c~lbre when Lilburne appealed to the
Commons, which declared his sentence void and contrary to English
law. By 1640, England was facing civil war internally and a Scottish
war externally. When the situation dramatically deteriorated, the
Long Parliament (so dominated by Puritans and common lawyers)
convened in 1640. In 1641, this body responded to the tremendous
public outcry generated by Lilburne and similar cases, and abolished both the Court of the Star Chamber and the High Commission.
Therefore, by 1641 the oath ex officio had clearly been abolished; however, this only entailed that a person in ecclesiastic proceedings could not be forced to answer questions prior to a formal
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
REv. 213

See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 235.
81 Eng. Rep. 42 (1616).
See L. LEvy, supra note 106, at 258-59, 263.
See Kemp, supra note 118, at 276.
See generally Wolfram, John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillarof Fire, 3 SYRACUSE L.
(1952).
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indictment and notification to him of the charges. The question
then becomes, how did the right against self-incrimination in common law courts evolve out of this development? This is especially
puzzling since common law judges, as well as those accused,
"proceeded on the theory that after pleading to the indictment, the
accused could be asked, and was required to answer, directly incriminating questions.' ' 39 According to Holdsworth " and Corwin, 4
the public attention focused upon the abolition of the High Commission and the Star Chamber, and the prominence given in legal
and public debates to Coke's maxim of "nemo tenetur seipsum
prodere," convinced the general public that nobody could be compelled, under any condition, to give incriminating evidence against
himself. The fine distinction between questions asked before or after
formal indictment was unfamiliar to the great mass of people. Notes
Wigmore:
Up to the last moment, Lilburne had never claimed the right to refuse
absolutely to answer a criminating question; he had merely claimed
a proper proceeding of presentment or accusation. But now this once
vital distinction comes to be ignored. It begins to be claimed, flatly,
that no man is bound to incriminate himself, on any charge (no
matter how properly instituted), or in any court (not merely in the
ecclesiastical or Star Chamber tribunals). Then this claim comes to
be conceded by the judges .... "I
By the time of the Restoration (1660), the right against selfincrimination had been secured and extended even to witnesses not
themselves charged with a criminal offense. Following the Glorious
Revolution in 1688, the questioning of accused criminal defendants,
even voluntarily, ceased until a statute in 189843 allowed a criminal
defendant to testify at his own trial if he chose. As early as 1700,
the right had been extended to protect parties and witnesses in civil
proceedings from compulsory disclosure of information that could
lead to criminal prosecution.
139. See Morgan, supra note 111, at 9.
140. See W. HOLDSWORTH, IX A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 199-200 ( 3rd ed. 1944).
141. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
MICH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1930).
142. See Wigmore, supra note 107, at 633. It has also been suggested, most noticeably
by Horowitz, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-How Did It Originate?, 31 TEMP. L.
REv. 121, 136-39 (1958), that the persecuted Puritans turned to the Old Testament and found
support for their opposition to the oath in the ancient Hebrew. law. Mandelbaum, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish Law, 5 J. OF COMP. L. 115
(1956); L. LEvY supra note 106, Appendix: Talmudic Law, at 433-41.
143. 61 & 62 Vict., C. 36 (1898). See T. PLUCKrr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 387-88 (2d ed. 1936).
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The Drafting of the Fifth Amendment
It appears evident, from the historical record, that the right not
to be a witness against oneself in a criminal prosecution was recognized and protected in several of the colonies prior to the revolution.
As Pittman notes, "the privilege against self-incrimination to one
accused came to be fairly well established in the New England
colonies before 1650 and in Virginia shortly thereafter.""' This
seems understandable, since the Puritan emigres would be most
sensitive to the significance of the right in England. After 1700,
especially, the right was increasingly recognized as being essential
to just criminal procedure." 5 This was due to a number of factors,
principally the increasing professionalization of the colonial legal
profession brought about by training in England and the use of
English law books (especially Blackstone and Coke) in America.",
Also important was the fight over the general warrants, both in
England and America, which in part was based upon the premise
that broad powers to search and seize such materials as private
papers forced a person to accuse himself."7 Another significant reason was the inquisitorial powers of the royal governors and their
councils who often summoned individuals for interrogation without
formal charges to try and pressure them into making confessions."'
And finally, the inquisitorial procedure employed by the vice admirality courts in customs cases, tried without the safeguards of the
common law or the presence of a jury, emphasized the need for the
protection of the right."' By 1789, seven states had inserted the
protection into their constitutions or bills of rights.'1
The general pattern followed by the state constitutions embodying the privilege, as well as the proposed amendments offered
by the state conventions ratifying the Constitution, was suggested
by section eight of the Virginia Bill of Rights (1776): "That in all
capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the
B.

144. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the PrivilegeAgainst SelfIncriminationin America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 781 (1935).
145. See Levy and Leder, 'Exotic Fruit': The Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination in Colonial New York, 20 WM. & MARY L.Q. 3 (1963).
146. See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 368-72. On the colonial legal profession, see L.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERiCAN'LAw 29-30 (1973). See also Reinsch, English Common Law
in the Early American Colonies, in I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERiCAN HISTORY 367 (1907);
and F. AuMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTRm: SOME SELECTED PHASES 3-66 (1940).
147. See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 390.
148. See Pittman, supra note 144, at 783-84.
149. The most complete treatment on these courts is found in C. UBBELOHDE, THE VICEADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERiCAN REVOLUTION (1960).
150. See L. LEvy, supra note 106, at 109.
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cause and nature of his accusation . . .nor can he be compelled
to give evidence against himself."' 5 ' According to Pittman, this
privilege "covered all prosecutions, whether judicial, legislative or
executive so long as those prosecutions were either 'capital or
criminal.' """2 It could therefore be seen as being broad, in that it was
not limited simply to judicial prosecutions. It was, however, equally
obvious, as Levy cautions, 5 3 that the right was narrower than the
common law guarantee since it applied only to a criminal defendant
at his trial, not to civil cases or other non-criminal proceedings that
might yield up criminal evidence. Of the states incorporating bills
of rights, three (Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Vermont) followed the limited Virginia pattern: "In all prosecutions for criminal
offense . . . ." Three other states (New Hampshire, Delaware, and
Maryland) chose different wording, typified by John Adams' draft
in Massachusetts: "No subject shall be . . compelled to accuse or
5
furnish evidence against himself.' '
This version was more in accord with the English origins of the right, for it protected the person
wherever he might be subject to questioning.
In drafting his proposal for the amendment, Madison could also
draw upon the suggestions offered by the four states (Virginia, New
York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island) who had sent along proposed amendments with their ratification documents. These versions were all based upon the Virginia language, and they all seemed
to be limited to "capital and criminal prosecutions." Nevertheless,
Madison's own wording introduced to the first Congress indicated
his effort to make the protection as broad as possible: "No person
. . .shall be compelled to be a witness against himself ... ,,5 As
Levy explains:
Madison's proposal certainly applied to civil as well as criminal proceedings and in principle to any stage of a legal inquiry, from the
moment of arrest in a criminal case, to the swearing of a deposition
in a civil one. And not being restricted to judicial proceedings it
extended to any other kind of governmental inquiry such as a legislative investigation. Moreover, the unique phrasing, that none could be
compelled to be a witness against himself, was far more comprehensive than a prohibition against self-incrimination. By its terms the
clause could also apply to any testimony that fell short of making one
151.
152.
509, 511
153.
154.
155.

Quoted in E. DUBAULD, supra note 17, at 171.
Pittman, The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J.
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Pittman, Fifth Amendment].
See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 407.
See Pittman, Fifth Amendment, supra note 152, at 512.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834).
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vulnerable to criminal jeopardy or civil penalty or forfeiture, but that
nevertheless exposed him to public disgrace or obloquy, or other injury to name and reputation. Finally, Madison's phrasing protected
third parties who were merely witnesses called to give testimony for
or the other, whether in civil, criminal, or equity proceedone side
56
ings.'
However, this broad protection would be modified in intent as the
proposed amendment was discussed in the House.
On August 17, 1789, the House began its discussion of the committee report on Madison's proposed amendment. The Annals record:
Mr. Lawrence said this clause contained a general declaration, in
some degree contrary to laws passed. He alluded to that part where
a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. He
thought it ought to be confined to criminal cases, and moved an
which amendment being adopted
amendment for that purpose; .
157

Lawrence was apparently thinking of a provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 (having been passed by the Senate and awaiting final
House action) "which required that parties to civil litigation produce relevant books and papers.' 5 8 While such compulsory civil
procedure would not incriminate a defendant, it did allow him to
be a witness against himself in respect to the evidence upon which
the civil judgment would be rendered. 15 9 Whatever the reason for
Lawrence's amendment, its clear intent was to limit the future fifth
amendment to criminal cases alone. The Senate did not modify the
House version, but it did extract the protection against double jeopardy and lump it together with other procedural safeguards in the
sixth amendment. To Levy, this suggests that neither the House nor
Senate meant to limit the self-incrimination privilege to the criminal defendant on trial. "The Fifth Amendment, even with the selfincrimination clause restricted to criminal cases, still put its principle broadly enough to apply to witnesses and to any phase of the
proceedings.' 6 0
The apparent limitation of the privilege to criminal cases presents an interesting question. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
156. See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 423-24.
157. I ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834).
158. Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 19, 33 (1955).
159. This point is disputed by Williams, id. at 33, but for an opposing argument see
Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or
Common-Law?, 4 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 107, 114-17 (1960).
160. See L. LEVY, supra note 106, at 427.
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privilege extends to civil cases 6 ' (where criminal evidence could
conceivably be elicited), grand jury proceedings,'62 and even legislative investigations.' 3 Can these two lines of development, that leading to the writing of the fifth amendment and the Court's subsequent liberal interpretation, be reconciled? If, in fact, Lawrence did
insert the words "in any criminal case" merely to avoid conflict with
the Judiciary Act, i.e., to allow the complusory production of civil
evidence in civil cases, then the Court's expanded interpretation of
the amendment to bar the compulsory extraction of criminal evidence at any type of proceeding is not foreclosed:
Under this view, this Supreme Court's construction of the purpose of
the constitutional provision is clearly correct: The privilege was intended to be applicable in any type of proceeding to protect against
the use of compulsion upon a witness to give evidence of his criminal
liability."'
This position is, however, dependent upon the historical factwhich has not been proven-that Lawrence was indeed thinking
of the Judiciary Act provision.
But setting aside this viewpoint, what if the clear intent of the
amendment is found in its language: could the privilege only be
claimed in a criminal case? Corwin has suggested that the principal
concern of the Bill of Rights' authors was to remedy the harshness
of the common law in respect to accused persons.' 5 The language
of the four proposed state amendments, all of which stress "in criminal cases," supports this view. Therefore, it is argued, the framers
were not at this stage particularly concerned about protecting individuals in other types of proceedings, and so they limited Madison's
proposal in accordance with the state suggestions. 66 In fact, of
course, the privilege was placed in the fifth amendment, rather than
with the bulk of criminal procedural guarantees in the sixth, which
may suggest that the privilege was meant to incorporate the full
common law privileges, and not be limited to criminal trials. 67
The most accurate position seems to be one that is suggested
161. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1922).
162. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
163. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S.
190 (1955).
164. Note, Applicability of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legislative
Investigations, 49 COLtM. L. Rav. 87, 94 (1949).
165. See Corwin, supra note 141, at 12.
166. See note 164 supra at 92.
167. See L. LEvy, supra note 106, at 427..

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/2

19771

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF PRIVACY

by Levy,'
Morgan, 69 and Corwin. 7 " The right against selfincrimination in this view, was so widely known and held so significant that it was only necessary to make a brief reference to it in the
Constitution. Indeed, Levy's extensive research indicates that from
the first, both in state and federal courts, it was simply assumed
that the meaning of the privilege was to be drawn from its common
law heritage.' This seems most logical, in thinking of Lawrence's
modification of Madison's proposal, since the common law privilege
did not apply to non-incriminating evidence given in civil cases.
Even the language itself appears to sustain the broad reading subsequently given to it. If the principle is to protect an individual
against the forced extraction of incriminating evidence against himself, then the privilege would mean little if it could be easily circumvented by posing the same questions in civil proceedings, grand jury
hearings, or legislative investigations. The entire history of the privilege's evolution indicated that it was meant to offer complete, not
partial, protection against the evils of an inquisitorial system of
justice.
C.

The Policy of the Privilege

As important as the origins of the privilege, considering that the
focus of this discussion involves privacy, is the policy behind the
concept of immunity from self-incrimination. Probably the most
complete catalog of reasons supporting the privilege has been offered by former Justice Goldberg in his Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission opinion (1964).
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations; our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
"a fair state-individual balance by requiring government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and be
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load . . ."; our respect for the invincibility of the
human personality and of the right to each individual "to a private'
enclave where he may lead a private life . . ."; our distrust of self168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 430.
See Morgan, supra note 111, at 23.
See Corwin, supra note 141, at 12.
See L. LEvy, supra note 106, 429-30.
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deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."' 2
Of these many rationales suggested to sustain the privilege against
self-incrimination, three appear to be the most basic and all-encompassing.
In his most influential volume, The Fifth Amendment Today,7
Erwin Griswold declares "the privilege against self-incrimination is
one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized."'' The first reason this is so relates to the fact that the
privilege does away with the feasibility of using torture to force an
individual suspect to confess.15 It renders the criminal justice system both more humane and accurate, since coerced confessions are
often inaccurate as well as cruel. Second, notes Griswold, the privilege underlies the basic conception of an adversary, as contrasted
with an inquistorial system, of criminal law. Since the legal system
cannot simply rely upon the defendant to provide evidence, it must
itself search out sufficient proof to demonstrate reasonable cause.
This, then, allows the potential defendant to remain free from interference until society can justify in a court of law its right to imprison
him.' Another variation on this argument is the "fair-fight"
proposition: in order to imprison an individual, society ought to
have more proof than simply the defendant's own words to convict
him.
Perhaps the most significant justification for the privilege is
expressed by Griswold in the following language:
Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political views are
essential elements in the charge, it may be most difficult to get
evidence from sources other than the suspected or accused person
himself. Hence, the significance of the privilege over the years has
perhaps been greatest in connection with resistance to prosecution for
such offenses as heresy or political crimes. In these areas the privilege
against self-incrimination has been a protection for freedom of
172. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See generally MacNaughton, The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination:Its ConstitutionalAffectation, Raison d'Etre and MiscellaneousImplications,
51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 138 (1960) [hereinafter cited as MacNaughton].
173. E. GRISWOLD, THE Ftrm AMENDMENT TODAY (1955), See also Griswold, The Fifth
Amendment, 39 MAss. L.Q. 44 (1954); The Fifth Amendment as a Symbol, 28 CONN. B.J.
451 (1954); The Fifth Amendment Today, 39 MARQ.L. REv. 191 (1956); and The Right to be
Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 217 (1960).
174. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 173, at 7.
175. See Connery, The Right to Silence, 39 MAQ. L. REv. 180, 184 (1956).
176. See MacNaughton, supra note 172, at 146-49.
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thought and a hindrance to any government which might wish to
prosecute for thoughts and opinions alone.'77
Abe Fortas, as well, notes that the privilege arose to block the power
of government to invade the mind of man and "take dominion of
his will."' 8 Further, declares Fortas: "There is little difference in
theory, I suggest, between breaking into a man's house and forcing
an entry into his mind to compel him to testify against himself.' '17
In short, suggests Carl Imlay, the privilege is "protection from unlimited inquiry into private affairs under the guise of law."8 ' To grant
the government the unlimited power to breach the privacy of a
man's mind is not only to undermine the privilege's long battle for
"personal dignity and liberty against collective might and governmental tyranny,"'' but to annihilate the very citadel of individuality and independent judgment.'
This intimate relationship between privacy and self-incrimination is discussed by Robert B. McKay in a significant article. 8 3 For
McKay, two arguments favor a continued broad interpretation of
the fifth amendment privilege. The first is the need to insure
morality in the operations of government; i.e., integrity in the
workings of the judicial system. "The second principal argument in
favor of a continued liberal interpretation of the privilege against
self-incrimination arises out of the concern for individual privacy
that has always been a fundamental tenet of the American value
structure."'8 4 Clearly a relationship between the amendment and
privacy can be traced back to the Boyd case in 1886. However, with
the ever-increasing demands for information on the part of government, especially legislative investigations, the fifth amendment has
become crucial in protecting privacy of belief, particularly since the
Supreme Court has been hesitant to allow a full first amendment
defense of silence.
More recently an awareness has developed of the relationship between the First and Fifth Amendments. It should not be difficult to
177. See E. GRiSWOLD, supra note 173, at 8-9.
178. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Neme Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEy. B.A.J.
91, 96, 98 (1954).
179. Id. at 99.
180. Imlay, The ParadoxicalSelf-Incrimination Rule, 6 MLAmi L.Q. 147 (1952).
181. Kenealy, Fifth Amendment Morals, 3 CATH. LAW. 340, 341 (1957).
182. The privilege has also been justified on natural law grounds. See McManus, The
NaturalLaw and the Fifth Amendment, 3 CATH. LAW. 6 (1957); Connery, Morality and the
Fifth Amendment, 3 CATH. LAW. 137 (1957); and C. ANTIwAU, supra note 80, at 104-08.
183. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193-222
(1967).
184. Id. at 210.
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understand that the Fifth Amendment, rooted as it is in part in the
struggle in England during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to
achieve freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, bears a close
relationship to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The
First notion that no man may be compelled to worship or to speak in
any particular way-or at all-may be regarded as an enlarged version of the more specific Fifth Amendment notion that no man shall
be required to convict himself out of his own mouth. If the right to
speak and write without official restraint is guaranteed by the First
Amendment, as all agree is the case, does it not follow that there is a
parallel freedom not to speak and not to write? This may be described
as a freedom of silence . . .
Nutting has argued, however, that. neither the first nor the fifth
amendment can fully protect privacy; complete protection will only
come about when the interest in privacy is recognized for what it is
and safeguarded accordingly.'u
A major opponent of the privacy-fifth amendment relationship
is Judge Henry J. Friendly. Friendly fears that too free a use of the
privacy rubric will deny the entire system of testimonial complusion. Further, there are perhaps grosser violations of privacy prevalent in civil proceedings, such as paternity suits and suits for annulment based upon sexual inadequacy, yet no one claims that the
Constitution is offended by this. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has sanctioned a wide variety of immunity statutes which invade
privacy as effectively as if there were no privilege."s7 To allow one
to cloak himself in an impregnable cocoon of privacy by claiming
the fifth amendment is morally corrupt and endangers society's
ability to protect itself.8 8 Similarly, Lewis Mayers suggests that for
the legal system to properly operate, privacy must on occasion be
"ruthlessly invaded": The bugaboo of individual privacy has been
too frequently used to prevent the law from punishing the most
dangerous of criminal activities."'
Irrespective of the warnings of critics such as Friendly, Mayers,
and Nutting, the Court has chosen to interpret broadly the constitutional language of the fifth amendment.110 The privilege can now be
185. Id. at 212.
186. Nutting, The Fifth Amendment and Privacy, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 533, 543 (1957).
Another argument hostile toward the right to silence is found in S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND
THE FivrH AMENDMENT 121-23 (1963).
187. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); and Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
188. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 687-90 (1968).
189. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE Frm AMENDMENT? 162-63 (1959).
190. See generally Clark, supra note 4, at 871-81.
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claimed at civil proceedings, grand jury hearings, congressional investigations, and any other place where conceivably incriminating
evidence might be compulsorily elicited. The fifth amendment consequently stands as the ultimate protection for the privacy of the
mind; one that cannot, such as the fourth amendment, be reached
under reasonable conditions. Paradoxically, however, the Court has
allowed immunity statutes to operate which appear to curtail the
very protection for privacy that the Court has so patiently built,
decision by decision, over the last ninety years. 1 ' Nevertheless, the
fifth amendment has been consistently developed to protect the
most crucial aspect of individual privacy-the mind of the solitary
individual. As such, it complements the protections offered by the
first and fourth amendments for the other components of the
constitutional right to privacy.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

This article has sought to demonstrate that the protection of
privacy comprised one of the core values motivating the addition of
the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution. As a consequence, the Supreme Court's reliance upon these amendments to
help fashion a constitutional right to privacy is historically justified.
This is not to argue, however, that the Supreme Court is ever a
prisoner of history, though history can provide an invaluable
perspective for dealing with contemporary problems. 92' As one commentator has noted:
History thus provides enlightment. Indeed, the Court frequently says
that it reads the provisions of the Constitution "in the light of" history. The image of light suggest most clearly how history should be
used. It is neither prologue on the one hand, nor director of the drama
on the other; rather, history is a spotlight, always available to illumine, but not to blind. History does not provide the answers to the
problems of today; it merely helps to frame the questions.5 3
191. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); and Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). For effective analysis, consult S.
HOFSTANDTER, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE IMMUNITY ACT OF 1954
(1956); Brownell,
Immunity from Prosecutionversus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28 TuL. L. REV. 1
(1953); Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political Deviants, 55 MICH. L. REV. 375; and
Comment, The Unconstitutionalityof Use Immunity: Half a Loaf is Not Enough, 46 U. So.
CALIF. L. REV. 202 (1972).
192. See generally C. MILLER, THE SUPREME Couir AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
193. Woffard, The BlindingLight: The Uses of History in ConstitutionalIntrepretation,
31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 532-33 (1964). See also Wyzanski, History and Law, 26 U. CHI. L.
REV. 237 (1959).
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Therefore, while history can afford valuable assistance to the
Supreme Court by enriching the perspective of the justices, it cannot be allowed to become a stiffling straight-jacket dictating what
solutions contemporary law can develop to meet today's unique
challenges."'
When this view on the proper uses of history is coupled with
Marshall's famous dictum about a "constitution intended to endure
for ages to come,""' 5 it becomes evident why this discussion has
relied so heavily upon historical analysis. The Constitution is,
among other things, a statement of enduring values. While the challenges to those values may change over time, the values themselves
remain constant. In acting to explicitly recognize and safeguard a
constitutional right to privacy, and in part basing that right upon
the fourth and fifth amendments, the Warren Court could rely upon
an unbroken legacy stretching far back into English legal history.
This legacy comprises a continuing commitment of the English
common law, the drafters of the Constitution, and earlier Supreme
Courts to protect what we now recognize and designate as
"privacy." While the problem in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries might have been invasion of the home by means of general
warrants, history demonstrates the value at stake there was the
same as that endangered by the technology of the space age: privacy. When the drafters of the fifth amendment foreclosed forever
any use of the oath ex officio in America, safeguarding the privacy
of the mind was their penultimate objective, as it had been for Coke
and the common law judges. Griswold v. Connecticut represents but
a recent stage in this continual development. Privacy certainly is
not now, nor probably ever will be, inviolably secure. Future Supreme Courts will confront new challenges to privacy, in the process
both building upon and extending this historical legacy devoted to
sheltering privacy.
For an example of the inflexible use of history in constitutional interpretation, see
(1953).
195. "[A] constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
316, 415 (1819).
194.

W.

CROSSKEY, POLMCS AND THE CONSTITUTION

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/2

